Accounting Conservatism and Board Characteristics: Portuguese Evidence

  • Sandra Alves School of Accountancy and Administration, University of Aveiro
Keywords: Board Structure, Conservatism Accounting, CMVM’s recommendations


For a sample of 26 non-financial listed Portuguese firms-year from 2002 to 2016, this study extends previous research by empirically examining how board structure affects the magnitude of accounting conservatism for companies listed in Portugal. Mainly, we focus on the main characteristics of the board structure that are highlighted by the Portuguese Securities Market Supervisory Authority’s recommendations: board size, board composition, board’s monitoring committees and number of board meeting. This study predicts and finds a non-linear relationship between board size and conservatism. Specifically, we find that as board size increases up to 8 members, the sample firms employ more conservatism, consistent with the idea that smaller boards can be more effective than larger boards in monitoring managerial behaviour. When board size reaches beyond 8 members, a negative relationship between board size and conservatism accounting occurs. We also find that both boards comprised of more non-executive members and high board meetings frequency lead firms to report more conservatively.


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How to Cite
Sandra Alves. (2021). Accounting Conservatism and Board Characteristics: Portuguese Evidence. International Journal of Business and Society, 22(3), 1346-1362.