Accounting Conservatism and Board Characteristics: Portuguese Evidence
Abstract
For a sample of 26 non-financial listed Portuguese firms-year from 2002 to 2016, this study extends previous research by empirically examining how board structure affects the magnitude of accounting conservatism for companies listed in Portugal. Mainly, we focus on the main characteristics of the board structure that are highlighted by the Portuguese Securities Market Supervisory Authority’s recommendations: board size, board composition, board’s monitoring committees and number of board meeting. This study predicts and finds a non-linear relationship between board size and conservatism. Specifically, we find that as board size increases up to 8 members, the sample firms employ more conservatism, consistent with the idea that smaller boards can be more effective than larger boards in monitoring managerial behaviour. When board size reaches beyond 8 members, a negative relationship between board size and conservatism accounting occurs. We also find that both boards comprised of more non-executive members and high board meetings frequency lead firms to report more conservatively.
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